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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:55:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-90314 — remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90314</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;table-&amp;gt;offset[i] is a u32 from firmware, but was stored into a signed
int.  A crafted offset like 0xFFFFFFF0 becomes -16, placing hdr 16 bytes
before the table buffer.  The subsequent avail check was bypassed
because the negative int was promoted to a large size_t in the
expression &amp;#34;table_sz - offset - sizeof(*hdr)&amp;#34;, yielding a large positive
avail and letting the out-of-bounds hdr-&amp;gt;type read proceed undetected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Store the offset as u32 and validate it with unsigned comparisons before
any pointer arithmetic.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;table-&amp;gt;offset[i] is a u32 from firmware, but was stored into a signed
int.  A crafted offset like 0xFFFFFFF0 becomes -16, placing hdr 16 bytes
before the table buffer.  The subsequent avail check was bypassed
because the negative int was promoted to a large size_t in the
expression &amp;#34;table_sz - offset - sizeof(*hdr)&amp;#34;, yielding a large positive
avail and letting the out-of-bounds hdr-&amp;gt;type read proceed undetected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Store the offset as u32 and validate it with unsigned comparisons before
any pointer arithmetic.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90314</guid>
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