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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 22:06:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-90226 — nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90226</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc_llcp_getsockopt() casts optval to (u32 __user *) for put_user(), so
the kernel always stores 4 bytes regardless of the caller-supplied
optlen. The existing min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32)) only clamps the length
reported back to userspace; it does not constrain the store. A call with
optlen &amp;lt; 4 therefore writes past the user buffer, violating the
getsockopt(2) contract for all five supported optnames.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject any call with optlen &amp;lt; sizeof(u32) up front. &amp;#39;len&amp;#39; is int, so a
plain size comparison would promote a negative optlen to size_t and slip
past the check; an explicit &amp;#39;len &amp;lt; 0&amp;#39; test is added first to catch
negative values before the size compare.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc_llcp_getsockopt() casts optval to (u32 __user *) for put_user(), so
the kernel always stores 4 bytes regardless of the caller-supplied
optlen. The existing min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32)) only clamps the length
reported back to userspace; it does not constrain the store. A call with
optlen &amp;lt; 4 therefore writes past the user buffer, violating the
getsockopt(2) contract for all five supported optnames.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject any call with optlen &amp;lt; sizeof(u32) up front. &amp;#39;len&amp;#39; is int, so a
plain size comparison would promote a negative optlen to size_t and slip
past the check; an explicit &amp;#39;len &amp;lt; 0&amp;#39; test is added first to catch
negative values before the size compare.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90226</guid>
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