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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:49:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-90088 — Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter
Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer
sends an MTU of zero, d-&amp;gt;mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg
path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment
has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never
decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all
system memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by clamping d-&amp;gt;mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated
value is zero, consistent with the initial value assigned in
rfcomm_dlc_alloc().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter
Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer
sends an MTU of zero, d-&amp;gt;mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg
path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment
has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never
decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all
system memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by clamping d-&amp;gt;mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated
value is zero, consistent with the initial value assigned in
rfcomm_dlc_alloc().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90088</guid>
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