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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:50:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-90069 — crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90069</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the
synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers
clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()
currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no
storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT
write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report
a slab OOB write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,
copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the
existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize
because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the
synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers
clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()
currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no
storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT
write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report
a slab OOB write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,
copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the
existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize
because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90069</guid>
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