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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:10:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-89879 — media: s2255: bound JPEG frame size before copying into the buffer</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89879</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;media: s2255: bound JPEG frame size before copying into the buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;s2255_fillbuff() memcpy()s vc-&amp;gt;jpg_size bytes of a captured JPEG/MJPEG
frame into the vb2 plane.  vc-&amp;gt;jpg_size is taken verbatim from the
S2255_MARKER_FRAME header the device sends (pdword[4] in save_frame())
and, unlike the frame payload length just above it, is never bounded:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload = le32_to_cpu(pdword[3]);
	if (payload &amp;gt; vc-&amp;gt;req_image_size)	/* payload is checked ... */
		return -EINVAL;
	vc-&amp;gt;pkt_size = payload;
	vc-&amp;gt;jpg_size = le32_to_cpu(pdword[4]);	/* ... jpg_size is not */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious or malfunctioning device can therefore report a jpg_size
larger than the destination vb2 plane, and the memcpy() writes past it.
jpg_size is a signed int, so a value with the top bit set also turns
into a huge length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject a frame whose jpg_size is negative or exceeds the plane size
before copying it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;media: s2255: bound JPEG frame size before copying into the buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;s2255_fillbuff() memcpy()s vc-&amp;gt;jpg_size bytes of a captured JPEG/MJPEG
frame into the vb2 plane.  vc-&amp;gt;jpg_size is taken verbatim from the
S2255_MARKER_FRAME header the device sends (pdword[4] in save_frame())
and, unlike the frame payload length just above it, is never bounded:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload = le32_to_cpu(pdword[3]);
	if (payload &amp;gt; vc-&amp;gt;req_image_size)	/* payload is checked ... */
		return -EINVAL;
	vc-&amp;gt;pkt_size = payload;
	vc-&amp;gt;jpg_size = le32_to_cpu(pdword[4]);	/* ... jpg_size is not */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious or malfunctioning device can therefore report a jpg_size
larger than the destination vb2 plane, and the memcpy() writes past it.
jpg_size is a signed int, so a value with the top bit set also turns
into a huge length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject a frame whose jpg_size is negative or exceeds the plane size
before copying it.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89879</guid>
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