<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 08:43:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89843 — scsi: qla2xxx: Zero-init bsg stack buffers to avoid info leak</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89843</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: qla2xxx: Zero-init bsg stack buffers to avoid info leak&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several bsg handlers stage their request/reply in an uninitialized 256-byte
on-stack buffer (uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]) and fill it via
sg_copy_to_buffer(), which only copies as many bytes as the user-supplied
request payload. When the request is shorter than the structure, the
remainder of the buffer is left holding stale stack data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;qla2x00_read_fru_status() and qla2x00_read_i2c() then copy the full
structure back to the reply payload with sg_copy_from_buffer(), leaking the
uninitialized stack bytes to user space. The write/update paths do not copy
the buffer back, but can feed uninitialized fields to the device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zero the stack buffer at declaration in all five handlers, mirroring the
heap kzalloc() approach, so short requests can no longer expose stale
memory.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: qla2xxx: Zero-init bsg stack buffers to avoid info leak&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several bsg handlers stage their request/reply in an uninitialized 256-byte
on-stack buffer (uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]) and fill it via
sg_copy_to_buffer(), which only copies as many bytes as the user-supplied
request payload. When the request is shorter than the structure, the
remainder of the buffer is left holding stale stack data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;qla2x00_read_fru_status() and qla2x00_read_i2c() then copy the full
structure back to the reply payload with sg_copy_from_buffer(), leaking the
uninitialized stack bytes to user space. The write/update paths do not copy
the buffer back, but can feed uninitialized fields to the device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zero the stack buffer at declaration in all five handlers, mirroring the
heap kzalloc() approach, so short requests can no longer expose stale
memory.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89843</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
