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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:35:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89819 — drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89819</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the CRTC degamma path, which is guarded by
amdgpu_dm_verify_lut_sizes(), the per-plane degamma LUT size was never
validated before use. __set_dm_plane_degamma() passed the user-supplied
size straight into __is_lut_linear() and, for a non-linear LUT, into
__set_input_tf() -&amp;gt; __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(), the latter always iterating
MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES entries regardless of the actual LUT size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malformed AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT blob (e.g. a single entry) could thus
trigger a divide-by-zero in __is_lut_linear() or an out-of-bounds read in
__drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(). Reject any plane degamma LUT whose size does not
match MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES, mirroring the invariant the code already
asserts a few lines below (and which the CRTC path enforces).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property is only exposed on builds with
AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the CRTC degamma path, which is guarded by
amdgpu_dm_verify_lut_sizes(), the per-plane degamma LUT size was never
validated before use. __set_dm_plane_degamma() passed the user-supplied
size straight into __is_lut_linear() and, for a non-linear LUT, into
__set_input_tf() -&amp;gt; __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(), the latter always iterating
MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES entries regardless of the actual LUT size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malformed AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT blob (e.g. a single entry) could thus
trigger a divide-by-zero in __is_lut_linear() or an out-of-bounds read in
__drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(). Reject any plane degamma LUT whose size does not
match MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES, mirroring the invariant the code already
asserts a few lines below (and which the CRTC path enforces).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property is only exposed on builds with
AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89819</guid>
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