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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:00:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89661 — NFSD: Prevent post-shutdown use-after-free in unlock_filesystem</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89661</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NFSD: Prevent post-shutdown use-after-free in unlock_filesystem&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Writing a filesystem path to /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_filesystem runs
nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb() before nfsd_mutex is held and before the
handler confirms that nn-&amp;gt;nfsd_serv is set. Once nfsd has shut down,
nfs4_state_destroy_net() has freed nn-&amp;gt;conf_id_hashtbl but left the
pointer intact, so the cancel helper iterates freed slab memory as an
array of struct list_head and then dereferences a bogus nfs4_client
when it takes clp-&amp;gt;async_lock. A local administrator holding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can reach this use-after-free by stopping the server and
then writing to unlock_filesystem; KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free
read in nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd4_revoke_states() walks the same state tables and for that reason
already runs only under nfsd_mutex with nn-&amp;gt;nfsd_serv confirmed
present. Move the async COPY cancel into that protected section so
every NFSv4 state-table walker on this path observes a running server.
Async copies exist only while the server runs, so gating the cancel on
nn-&amp;gt;nfsd_serv loses nothing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NFSD: Prevent post-shutdown use-after-free in unlock_filesystem&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Writing a filesystem path to /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_filesystem runs
nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb() before nfsd_mutex is held and before the
handler confirms that nn-&amp;gt;nfsd_serv is set. Once nfsd has shut down,
nfs4_state_destroy_net() has freed nn-&amp;gt;conf_id_hashtbl but left the
pointer intact, so the cancel helper iterates freed slab memory as an
array of struct list_head and then dereferences a bogus nfs4_client
when it takes clp-&amp;gt;async_lock. A local administrator holding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can reach this use-after-free by stopping the server and
then writing to unlock_filesystem; KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free
read in nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd4_revoke_states() walks the same state tables and for that reason
already runs only under nfsd_mutex with nn-&amp;gt;nfsd_serv confirmed
present. Move the async COPY cancel into that protected section so
every NFSv4 state-table walker on this path observes a running server.
Async copies exist only while the server runs, so gating the cancel on
nn-&amp;gt;nfsd_serv loses nothing.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89661</guid>
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