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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:02:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-89630 — smb: client: restore the data_offset bound in is_valid_oplock_break()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89630</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: restore the data_offset bound in is_valid_oplock_break()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 83bfbd0bb902 (&amp;#34;cifs: Remove the RFC1002 header from smb_hdr&amp;#34;)
changed the quantity this bound is measured against.  It used to be
srv-&amp;gt;total_read minus the 4-byte RFC1002 preamble that total_read then
included, so it was the SMB message length.  The same commit stopped
counting the preamble, and the mechanical substitution to
srv-&amp;gt;total_read - srv-&amp;gt;pdu_size left an expression that is identically
zero: standard_receive3() reads MID_HEADER_SIZE() bytes and then exactly
pdu_length - MID_HEADER_SIZE() more, adding both to total_read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;len is therefore 0, the subtraction below it wraps, and no __u32
DataOffset can exceed the result, so the check from commit 097f5863b1a0
(&amp;#34;cifs: read overflow in is_valid_oplock_break()&amp;#34;) no longer rejects
anything.  Use total_read, which is now the message length on its own.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: restore the data_offset bound in is_valid_oplock_break()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 83bfbd0bb902 (&amp;#34;cifs: Remove the RFC1002 header from smb_hdr&amp;#34;)
changed the quantity this bound is measured against.  It used to be
srv-&amp;gt;total_read minus the 4-byte RFC1002 preamble that total_read then
included, so it was the SMB message length.  The same commit stopped
counting the preamble, and the mechanical substitution to
srv-&amp;gt;total_read - srv-&amp;gt;pdu_size left an expression that is identically
zero: standard_receive3() reads MID_HEADER_SIZE() bytes and then exactly
pdu_length - MID_HEADER_SIZE() more, adding both to total_read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;len is therefore 0, the subtraction below it wraps, and no __u32
DataOffset can exceed the result, so the check from commit 097f5863b1a0
(&amp;#34;cifs: read overflow in is_valid_oplock_break()&amp;#34;) no longer rejects
anything.  Use total_read, which is now the message length on its own.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89630</guid>
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