<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:39:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89542 — SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89542</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and
ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN
(16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf-&amp;gt;len - base
to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base &amp;lt;= buf-&amp;gt;len. When
a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len
leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf)
      ptr = buf-&amp;gt;head[0].iov_base + offset
      ec  = *(ptr + 4)              /* OOB read on short head */
      rrc = *(ptr + 6)              /* OOB read on short head */
      rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc)
        xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &amp;amp;subbuf,
                           base, buf-&amp;gt;len - base)   /* u32 wrap when base &amp;gt; len */
        _rotate_left(&amp;amp;subbuf, shift)
          shift %= buf-&amp;gt;len         /* divide-by-zero when base == len */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf-&amp;gt;head[0].iov_len, len);
    movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
    BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen &amp;gt;
                                            buf-&amp;gt;head[0].iov_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to
min(A, B) &amp;gt; A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned
underflow of mov…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and
ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN
(16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf-&amp;gt;len - base
to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base &amp;lt;= buf-&amp;gt;len. When
a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len
leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf)
      ptr = buf-&amp;gt;head[0].iov_base + offset
      ec  = *(ptr + 4)              /* OOB read on short head */
      rrc = *(ptr + 6)              /* OOB read on short head */
      rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc)
        xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &amp;amp;subbuf,
                           base, buf-&amp;gt;len - base)   /* u32 wrap when base &amp;gt; len */
        _rotate_left(&amp;amp;subbuf, shift)
          shift %= buf-&amp;gt;len         /* divide-by-zero when base == len */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf-&amp;gt;head[0].iov_len, len);
    movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
    BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen &amp;gt;
                                            buf-&amp;gt;head[0].iov_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to
min(A, B) &amp;gt; A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned
underflow of mov…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89542</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
