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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:28:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-80561 — libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80561</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
   bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
   struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
   the validated buffer boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
   is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
   past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
   bogus boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
   immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
   send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
   the decode window entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_copy   -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_copy_safe
  *p += sizeof(...)  -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_skip_n
  ceph_decode_32(p)  -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_32_safe
  *p += len          -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_skip_n&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation.
-EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attacker mod…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
   bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
   struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
   the validated buffer boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
   is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
   past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
   bogus boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
   immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
   send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
   the decode window entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_copy   -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_copy_safe
  *p += sizeof(...)  -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_skip_n
  ceph_decode_32(p)  -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_32_safe
  *p += len          -&amp;gt; ceph_decode_skip_n&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation.
-EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attacker mod…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80561</guid>
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