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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 07:56:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-80560 — openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80560</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the
signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into
the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space.  All
other SR bits are left under user control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a
crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME.  With the data MMU disabled the
CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task
gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local
privilege escalation.  SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH
and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way.  The ptrace GPR regset
already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame
and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on
signal entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an
unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to
physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel&amp;#39;s mem=32M); afterwards the
same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the
signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into
the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space.  All
other SR bits are left under user control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a
crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME.  With the data MMU disabled the
CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task
gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local
privilege escalation.  SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH
and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way.  The ptrace GPR regset
already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame
and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on
signal entry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an
unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to
physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel&amp;#39;s mem=32M); afterwards the
same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80560</guid>
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