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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:33:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74727 — ovpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74727</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ovpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ovpn_nl_peer_set_doit() resolves the target peer via
ovpn_peer_get_by_id() before taking ovpn-&amp;gt;lock. In the window between
the lookup (which only takes a refcount) and the subsequent
spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;ovpn-&amp;gt;lock), a concurrent OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL, keepalive
expiry, or socket teardown can take ovpn-&amp;gt;lock first, run
ovpn_peer_remove() to unhash the peer from all four tables (by_id,
by_vpn_addr4/6, by_transp_addr) and release the lock. set_doit then
acquires ovpn-&amp;gt;lock and calls ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip(), which
re-inserts the now-removed peer back into the rehashing tables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same race affects the float path: ovpn_peer_endpoints_update()
holds only a refcount and acquires ovpn-&amp;gt;lock very late (after async
AEAD decrypt and a netlink notification), then rehashes the peer
in the by_transp_addr table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The resurrected peer becomes reachable again from the RX lookup
(ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr) and the TX VPN-IP lookup, even though
userspace believes it is gone. Once the data-path refcount drops the
peer is freed via call_rcu while the hash entries embedded in it
remain linked, opening a UAF window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bail out of the rehash when hash_entry_id is unhashed, mirroring
the sentinel already used by ovpn_peer_remove() to detect the
already-removed state. The check is safe under ovpn-&amp;gt;lock, which
serializes every mutation of hash_entry_id, and is a no-op for the
add path…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ovpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ovpn_nl_peer_set_doit() resolves the target peer via
ovpn_peer_get_by_id() before taking ovpn-&amp;gt;lock. In the window between
the lookup (which only takes a refcount) and the subsequent
spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;ovpn-&amp;gt;lock), a concurrent OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL, keepalive
expiry, or socket teardown can take ovpn-&amp;gt;lock first, run
ovpn_peer_remove() to unhash the peer from all four tables (by_id,
by_vpn_addr4/6, by_transp_addr) and release the lock. set_doit then
acquires ovpn-&amp;gt;lock and calls ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip(), which
re-inserts the now-removed peer back into the rehashing tables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same race affects the float path: ovpn_peer_endpoints_update()
holds only a refcount and acquires ovpn-&amp;gt;lock very late (after async
AEAD decrypt and a netlink notification), then rehashes the peer
in the by_transp_addr table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The resurrected peer becomes reachable again from the RX lookup
(ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr) and the TX VPN-IP lookup, even though
userspace believes it is gone. Once the data-path refcount drops the
peer is freed via call_rcu while the hash entries embedded in it
remain linked, opening a UAF window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bail out of the rehash when hash_entry_id is unhashed, mirroring
the sentinel already used by ovpn_peer_remove() to detect the
already-removed state. The check is safe under ovpn-&amp;gt;lock, which
serializes every mutation of hash_entry_id, and is a no-op for the
add path…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74727</guid>
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