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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:44:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74714 — bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74714</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto
the ehash chain, drops the bucket lock, and only afterwards sets
rsk_refcnt to 3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() handle this with
refcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses plain
sock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that the
lock guarantees sk_refcnt &amp;gt; 0. That assumption does not hold for
request_sock:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 0                                CPU 1
  -----                                -----
  tcp_conn_request()
   reqsk_queue_hash_req()
    inet_ehash_insert(req)
     spin_lock(bucket)
     __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req)      // rsk_refcnt == 0
     spin_unlock(bucket)
                                       bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()
                                        spin_lock(bucket)
                                        sock_hold(req)   &amp;lt;-- addition on 0
                                        spin_unlock(bucket)
    refcount_set(&amp;amp;req-&amp;gt;rsk_refcnt, 3)  // clobbers saturated value&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which surfaces as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1
  Call Trace:
   bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170
   bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200
   bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70
   bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410
   vfs_read+0xb9/0x380…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto
the ehash chain, drops the bucket lock, and only afterwards sets
rsk_refcnt to 3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() handle this with
refcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses plain
sock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that the
lock guarantees sk_refcnt &amp;gt; 0. That assumption does not hold for
request_sock:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 0                                CPU 1
  -----                                -----
  tcp_conn_request()
   reqsk_queue_hash_req()
    inet_ehash_insert(req)
     spin_lock(bucket)
     __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req)      // rsk_refcnt == 0
     spin_unlock(bucket)
                                       bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()
                                        spin_lock(bucket)
                                        sock_hold(req)   &amp;lt;-- addition on 0
                                        spin_unlock(bucket)
    refcount_set(&amp;amp;req-&amp;gt;rsk_refcnt, 3)  // clobbers saturated value&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which surfaces as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1
  Call Trace:
   bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170
   bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200
   bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70
   bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410
   vfs_read+0xb9/0x380…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74714</guid>
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