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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:35:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74703 — vhost-scsi: Validate T10 PI scatterlist counts</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74703</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vhost-scsi: Validate T10 PI scatterlist counts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When T10 PI is negotiated, vhost-scsi splits protection bytes from
the data iterator before mapping the request scatterlists. A malformed
request can claim protection bytes that cover or exceed the full payload
length. The former leaves no data bytes to map, while the latter
underflows exp_data_len before advancing the iterator. Both cases can let
a zero data SGL count reach sg_alloc_table_chained(), which triggers
BUG_ON(!nents).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject protection lengths that cover or exceed the payload before
subtracting prot_bytes and advancing the iterator. Also propagate
negative errors from the protection SGL calculation before calling the
allocator, matching the data SGL path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vhost-scsi: Validate T10 PI scatterlist counts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When T10 PI is negotiated, vhost-scsi splits protection bytes from
the data iterator before mapping the request scatterlists. A malformed
request can claim protection bytes that cover or exceed the full payload
length. The former leaves no data bytes to map, while the latter
underflows exp_data_len before advancing the iterator. Both cases can let
a zero data SGL count reach sg_alloc_table_chained(), which triggers
BUG_ON(!nents).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject protection lengths that cover or exceed the payload before
subtracting prot_bytes and advancing the iterator. Also propagate
negative errors from the protection SGL calculation before calling the
allocator, matching the data SGL path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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