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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:33:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74694 — net/ncsi: fix heap OOB read in NCSI_CMD_SEND_CMD payload length</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74694</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/ncsi: fix heap OOB read in NCSI_CMD_SEND_CMD payload length&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ncsi_send_cmd_nl() takes the number of bytes to copy from the
attacker-controlled ncsi_pkt_hdr.length field of the in-band packet
header, while the source buffer is the NCSI_ATTR_DATA netlink
attribute whose readable size is nla_len() - sizeof(ncsi_pkt_hdr).
The two length sources are never cross-checked: only
nla_len() &amp;gt;= sizeof(struct ncsi_pkt_hdr) is enforced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With hdr-&amp;gt;length set larger than the attribute payload (up to 65535
against at most 2032 readable bytes), ncsi_cmd_handler_oem() copies
past the end of the netlink attribute buffer with unsafe_memcpy(),
leaking up to ~64KB of kernel heap memory into the transmitted NCSI
command packet. The destination skb is sized by the declared payload,
so the write side does not overflow - this is a pure OOB read /
information leak, reachable with CAP_NET_ADMIN on systems with a
registered NCSI device (e.g. OpenBMC on Aspeed BMC SoCs, where
NET_NCSI=y is standard).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject commands whose declared payload extends past the end of the
data attribute.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent
Yunding Lab.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/ncsi: fix heap OOB read in NCSI_CMD_SEND_CMD payload length&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ncsi_send_cmd_nl() takes the number of bytes to copy from the
attacker-controlled ncsi_pkt_hdr.length field of the in-band packet
header, while the source buffer is the NCSI_ATTR_DATA netlink
attribute whose readable size is nla_len() - sizeof(ncsi_pkt_hdr).
The two length sources are never cross-checked: only
nla_len() &amp;gt;= sizeof(struct ncsi_pkt_hdr) is enforced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With hdr-&amp;gt;length set larger than the attribute payload (up to 65535
against at most 2032 readable bytes), ncsi_cmd_handler_oem() copies
past the end of the netlink attribute buffer with unsafe_memcpy(),
leaking up to ~64KB of kernel heap memory into the transmitted NCSI
command packet. The destination skb is sized by the declared payload,
so the write side does not overflow - this is a pure OOB read /
information leak, reachable with CAP_NET_ADMIN on systems with a
registered NCSI device (e.g. OpenBMC on Aspeed BMC SoCs, where
NET_NCSI=y is standard).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject commands whose declared payload extends past the end of the
data attribute.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent
Yunding Lab.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74694</guid>
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