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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:03:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74683 — Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74683</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK
ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt()
and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative
execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using
array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array
access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index
is out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We do not need additional array_index_nospec() calls in evdev_get_mask()
because evdev_get_mask_cnt() speculatively forces the count (and
resulting xfer_size) to 0 for out-of-bounds types, preventing any
speculative memory access to client evmasks array.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK
ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt()
and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative
execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using
array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array
access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index
is out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We do not need additional array_index_nospec() calls in evdev_get_mask()
because evdev_get_mask_cnt() speculatively forces the count (and
resulting xfer_size) to 0 for out-of-bounds types, preventing any
speculative memory access to client evmasks array.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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