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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 06:36:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74658 — futex: Prevent robust futex exit race some more</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74658</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;futex: Prevent robust futex exit race some more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A robust futex unlock stores 0 over the whole futex value - wiping
FUTEX_WAITERS - and wakes a single waiter. That wakeup is a one-shot
notification: the protocol relies on its recipient to either acquire the
futex (and eventually unlock while aware of the remaining contention) or
re-arm FUTEX_WAITERS before sleeping again.  If the woken waiter is killed
before it can do either, the kernel must jump in and wake the next task
down the line.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a known complication of the futex protocol with a previous
partial fix in commit ca16d5bee598 (&amp;#34;futex: Prevent robust futex exit
race&amp;#34;). Unfortunately, that fix is insufficient.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a third task re-acquired the futex through the uncontended fast
path in the meantime, the notification is lost: robust exit processing
sees that it is owned by another task and does nothing, while the new
owner sees no FUTEX_WAITERS when it unlocks and wakes nobody.
The remaining waiters sleep forever behind a free futex:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A owns the futex, B and C sleep in FUTEX_WAIT
                                        uval == A | FUTEX_WAITERS
  A robust unlock: store 0, FUTEX_WAKE(1) wakes B
                                        uval == 0
  D fast path acquire: cmpxchg(0 -&amp;gt; D)
                                        uval == D, no FUTEX_WAITERS
  B killed before acting on the wakeup
  B exit walk, pending op: owner D != B -&amp;gt; no action
  D unlo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;futex: Prevent robust futex exit race some more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A robust futex unlock stores 0 over the whole futex value - wiping
FUTEX_WAITERS - and wakes a single waiter. That wakeup is a one-shot
notification: the protocol relies on its recipient to either acquire the
futex (and eventually unlock while aware of the remaining contention) or
re-arm FUTEX_WAITERS before sleeping again.  If the woken waiter is killed
before it can do either, the kernel must jump in and wake the next task
down the line.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a known complication of the futex protocol with a previous
partial fix in commit ca16d5bee598 (&amp;#34;futex: Prevent robust futex exit
race&amp;#34;). Unfortunately, that fix is insufficient.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a third task re-acquired the futex through the uncontended fast
path in the meantime, the notification is lost: robust exit processing
sees that it is owned by another task and does nothing, while the new
owner sees no FUTEX_WAITERS when it unlocks and wakes nobody.
The remaining waiters sleep forever behind a free futex:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A owns the futex, B and C sleep in FUTEX_WAIT
                                        uval == A | FUTEX_WAITERS
  A robust unlock: store 0, FUTEX_WAKE(1) wakes B
                                        uval == 0
  D fast path acquire: cmpxchg(0 -&amp;gt; D)
                                        uval == D, no FUTEX_WAITERS
  B killed before acting on the wakeup
  B exit walk, pending op: owner D != B -&amp;gt; no action
  D unlo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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