CVE-2026-74650 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()

Affected: Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()

WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a received information element without checking that the element is long enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.

The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at pIE->data + 6, so it requires pIE->length to be at least 24 (WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a 4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE->data + 6 read past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.

The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with "pIE->length == WLAN_WMM_LEN". Move the equivalent check into the handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(), ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE->length.

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CVE-2026-74650 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()