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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:35:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74649 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74649</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WEP shared-key authentication handler uses the challenge-text
element&amp;#39;s attacker-controlled length without checking it against the
fixed 128-byte chg_txt buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In OnAuthClient() the length from rtw_get_ie() - up to 255 - is used
to perform memcpy() into the 128-byte pmlmeinfo-&amp;gt;chg_txt, so a
malicious AP sending a malformed WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE element can
overflow/underfill chg_txt by up to 127 bytes. It is reachable over the
air, before association, during shared-key authentication. In the case
of an overflow, the driver can write out of bounds. In the case of an
underfill, the driver can echo stale buffer memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The challenge text is defined to be exactly 128 octets, which is
already provided as the WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN define; require the
element to be exactly that length before use.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WEP shared-key authentication handler uses the challenge-text
element&amp;#39;s attacker-controlled length without checking it against the
fixed 128-byte chg_txt buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In OnAuthClient() the length from rtw_get_ie() - up to 255 - is used
to perform memcpy() into the 128-byte pmlmeinfo-&amp;gt;chg_txt, so a
malicious AP sending a malformed WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE element can
overflow/underfill chg_txt by up to 127 bytes. It is reachable over the
air, before association, during shared-key authentication. In the case
of an overflow, the driver can write out of bounds. In the case of an
underfill, the driver can echo stale buffer memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The challenge text is defined to be exactly 128 octets, which is
already provided as the WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN define; require the
element to be exactly that length before use.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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