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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:54:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74618 — binfmt_misc: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74618</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binfmt_misc: don&amp;#39;t warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsopen() records the caller&amp;#39;s user namespace in fc-&amp;gt;user_ns and hands
back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls
fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The
fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a
unix socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose.
vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for
FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc-&amp;gt;user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that
succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc-&amp;gt;user_ns.
So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in bm_fill_super():
create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call
fsopen(&amp;#34;binfmt_misc&amp;#34;) there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let
the parent issue FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain
unshare(1) and no capability is needed anywhere:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: fs/binfmt_misc.c:938 at bm_fill_super+0xa2/0xc0 [binfmt_misc]
  CPU: 15 UID: 1000 PID: 3243382 Comm: fswarn
  Call Trace:
   get_tree_keyed+0x7d/0xb0
   bm_get_tree+0x34/0x90 [binfmt_misc]
   vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100
   vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0
   __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on
may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning
the caller&amp;#39;s mount names…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binfmt_misc: don&amp;#39;t warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsopen() records the caller&amp;#39;s user namespace in fc-&amp;gt;user_ns and hands
back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls
fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The
fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a
unix socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose.
vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for
FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc-&amp;gt;user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that
succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc-&amp;gt;user_ns.
So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in bm_fill_super():
create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call
fsopen(&amp;#34;binfmt_misc&amp;#34;) there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let
the parent issue FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain
unshare(1) and no capability is needed anywhere:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: fs/binfmt_misc.c:938 at bm_fill_super+0xa2/0xc0 [binfmt_misc]
  CPU: 15 UID: 1000 PID: 3243382 Comm: fswarn
  Call Trace:
   get_tree_keyed+0x7d/0xb0
   bm_get_tree+0x34/0x90 [binfmt_misc]
   vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100
   vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0
   __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on
may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning
the caller&amp;#39;s mount names…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74618</guid>
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