<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 08:43:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74616 — xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74616</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xdpf_clone() clones broadcast copies into a single page and sets
frame_sz to PAGE_SIZE. __xdp_build_skb_from_frame() later treats that
page like a normal XDP frame and expects the usual skb_shared_info
tailroom at the end of the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current check only rejects frames whose linear xdp_frame header,
headroom, and packet data exceed PAGE_SIZE. A source frame backed by a
larger allocation can still satisfy that check while extending into the
clone&amp;#39;s required shared-info area. When such a clone is converted back
into an skb, build_skb_around() places skb_shared_info over live packet
bytes and later writes can corrupt XDP return metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject clones unless their linear area fits inside
SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE), matching the tailroom requirement already
enforced by the XDP-to-skb conversion path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xdpf_clone() clones broadcast copies into a single page and sets
frame_sz to PAGE_SIZE. __xdp_build_skb_from_frame() later treats that
page like a normal XDP frame and expects the usual skb_shared_info
tailroom at the end of the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current check only rejects frames whose linear xdp_frame header,
headroom, and packet data exceed PAGE_SIZE. A source frame backed by a
larger allocation can still satisfy that check while extending into the
clone&amp;#39;s required shared-info area. When such a clone is converted back
into an skb, build_skb_around() places skb_shared_info over live packet
bytes and later writes can corrupt XDP return metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject clones unless their linear area fits inside
SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE), matching the tailroom requirement already
enforced by the XDP-to-skb conversion path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74616</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
