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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:57:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74590 — fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74590</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space
referenced by a dynptr remains valid.  They do not, however, provide any
guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable.  kfuncs are
expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn&amp;#39;t follow that: it could crash if
arg-&amp;gt;digest_size was concurrently modified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg-&amp;gt;digest_size instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also widen &amp;#39;dynptr_sz&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;out_digest_sz&amp;#39; to u64 to match the return
type of __bpf_dynptr_size().  It doesn&amp;#39;t appear that it can actually be
more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes
file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space
referenced by a dynptr remains valid.  They do not, however, provide any
guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable.  kfuncs are
expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn&amp;#39;t follow that: it could crash if
arg-&amp;gt;digest_size was concurrently modified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg-&amp;gt;digest_size instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also widen &amp;#39;dynptr_sz&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;out_digest_sz&amp;#39; to u64 to match the return
type of __bpf_dynptr_size().  It doesn&amp;#39;t appear that it can actually be
more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes
file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74590</guid>
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