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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 22:08:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74584 — RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74584</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext() allocates uctx-&amp;gt;shpg via
__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL). The buddy allocator does not zero pages
without __GFP_ZERO, so the page contains stale kernel data from
whatever object most recently freed it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The page is then mapped into userspace via vm_insert_page() under
BNXT_RE_MMAP_SH_PAGE in bnxt_re_mmap(). The driver only ever writes
4 bytes (a u32 AVID) at offset BNXT_RE_AVID_OFFT (0x10) inside
bnxt_re_create_ah(); the remaining 4092 bytes of the page are exposed
to userspace unsanitised, leaking kernel memory contents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any user with access to /dev/infiniband/uverbsX on a host with a
bnxt_re device (typically rdma group membership) can read this data
via a single mmap() at pgoff 0 after IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Other shared pages in the same file already use get_zeroed_page()
correctly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
      srq-&amp;gt;uctx_srq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
      cq-&amp;gt;uctx_cq_page  = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;uctx-&amp;gt;shpg is the only outlier. Bring it in line with the existing
convention by switching to get_zeroed_page().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext() allocates uctx-&amp;gt;shpg via
__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL). The buddy allocator does not zero pages
without __GFP_ZERO, so the page contains stale kernel data from
whatever object most recently freed it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The page is then mapped into userspace via vm_insert_page() under
BNXT_RE_MMAP_SH_PAGE in bnxt_re_mmap(). The driver only ever writes
4 bytes (a u32 AVID) at offset BNXT_RE_AVID_OFFT (0x10) inside
bnxt_re_create_ah(); the remaining 4092 bytes of the page are exposed
to userspace unsanitised, leaking kernel memory contents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any user with access to /dev/infiniband/uverbsX on a host with a
bnxt_re device (typically rdma group membership) can read this data
via a single mmap() at pgoff 0 after IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Other shared pages in the same file already use get_zeroed_page()
correctly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
      srq-&amp;gt;uctx_srq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
      cq-&amp;gt;uctx_cq_page  = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;uctx-&amp;gt;shpg is the only outlier. Bring it in line with the existing
convention by switching to get_zeroed_page().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74584</guid>
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