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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:42:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-74339 — ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74339</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_seq_read() copies a queued variable-length event header to userspace
before expanding the payload. Queued variable-length events use
SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_CHAINED internally, and data.ext.ptr points at the first
extension cell.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The read side strips SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_* bits from data.ext.len before the
copy, but it leaves data.ext.ptr untouched. A userspace sequencer client
can therefore write a direct variable event to itself and read back the
extension-cell kernel address from the returned header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clear the temporary header pointer before copy_to_user(). The original
queued event remains unchanged and is still passed to
snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so payload expansion keeps using the
internal chain.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_seq_read() copies a queued variable-length event header to userspace
before expanding the payload. Queued variable-length events use
SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_CHAINED internally, and data.ext.ptr points at the first
extension cell.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The read side strips SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_* bits from data.ext.len before the
copy, but it leaves data.ext.ptr untouched. A userspace sequencer client
can therefore write a direct variable event to itself and read back the
extension-cell kernel address from the returned header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clear the temporary header pointer before copy_to_user(). The original
queued event remains unchanged and is still passed to
snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so payload expansion keeps using the
internal chain.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74339</guid>
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