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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:19:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-72195 — fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72195</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In do_action()&amp;#39;s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307),
lrh-&amp;gt;attr_off and lrh-&amp;gt;redo_len come from the on-disk LRH.
When they satisfy aoff + dlen &amp;lt; attr-&amp;gt;res.data_off, the
assignment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr-&amp;gt;res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1,
data_off=0x18).  Subsequent code that reads attr-&amp;gt;res.data_size
to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to
4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287
catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk
and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all
attributes.  A read site that picks an attribute by name and
reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered.
Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via
pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the
post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails
at -22 from mi_enum_attr).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In do_action()&amp;#39;s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307),
lrh-&amp;gt;attr_off and lrh-&amp;gt;redo_len come from the on-disk LRH.
When they satisfy aoff + dlen &amp;lt; attr-&amp;gt;res.data_off, the
assignment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr-&amp;gt;res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1,
data_off=0x18).  Subsequent code that reads attr-&amp;gt;res.data_size
to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to
4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287
catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk
and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all
attributes.  A read site that picks an attribute by name and
reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered.
Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via
pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the
post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails
at -22 from mi_enum_attr).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72195</guid>
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