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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:55:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-68289 — tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68289</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In tipc_recvmsg(), the copy length is computed as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;copy = min_t(int, dlen - offset, buflen);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;buflen is size_t but min_t(int, ...) casts it to int. When buflen
exceeds INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF via io_uring provided buffers), it
wraps negative, wins the comparison, and the negative copy length
propagates to simple_copy_to_iter() where int-to-size_t promotion
makes it SIZE_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON. tipc_recvstream() has the
same pattern.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
  RIP: 0010:simple_copy_to_iter+0x9e/0xd0 (net/core/datagram.c:521)
  Call Trace:
   __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0x8b0 (net/core/datagram.c:402)
   skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x77/0x1a0 (net/core/datagram.c:534)
   tipc_recvmsg+0x3d7/0xe80 (net/tipc/socket.c:1934)
   io_recvmsg+0x47e/0xda0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by changing min_t(int, ...) to min_t(size_t, ...) in both
functions. The result is always &amp;lt;= (dlen - offset), which is bounded
by TIPC maximum message size (0x1ffff bytes), so the implicit
narrowing on assignment to int copy is always safe.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In tipc_recvmsg(), the copy length is computed as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;copy = min_t(int, dlen - offset, buflen);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;buflen is size_t but min_t(int, ...) casts it to int. When buflen
exceeds INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF via io_uring provided buffers), it
wraps negative, wins the comparison, and the negative copy length
propagates to simple_copy_to_iter() where int-to-size_t promotion
makes it SIZE_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON. tipc_recvstream() has the
same pattern.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
  RIP: 0010:simple_copy_to_iter+0x9e/0xd0 (net/core/datagram.c:521)
  Call Trace:
   __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0x8b0 (net/core/datagram.c:402)
   skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x77/0x1a0 (net/core/datagram.c:534)
   tipc_recvmsg+0x3d7/0xe80 (net/tipc/socket.c:1934)
   io_recvmsg+0x47e/0xda0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by changing min_t(int, ...) to min_t(size_t, ...) in both
functions. The result is always &amp;lt;= (dlen - offset), which is bounded
by TIPC maximum message size (0x1ffff bytes), so the implicit
narrowing on assignment to int copy is always safe.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68289</guid>
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