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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:45:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-68187 — exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68187</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stop value is derived from bprm-&amp;gt;p &amp;gt;&amp;gt; PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable
is an unsigned long. If bprm-&amp;gt;p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes
zero the loop condition index &amp;gt;= stop is always true.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and
bprm-&amp;gt;page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array.
The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to
kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that
lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn&amp;#39;t
terminate either...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Getting there only requires bprm-&amp;gt;p &amp;lt; PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU
bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only
constraint on how far bprm-&amp;gt;p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e.
that each individual string still fits in what is left.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bprm-&amp;gt;p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a
single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves
it in the first page:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Oops - load access fault [#1]
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1
  epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
   ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae
   s4 : ffffffffffffffff   s2 : 0000000000000000
   a1 : ffffffdc98000000   a2 : 0000000000001000
  status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005
  [&amp;lt;801a5324&amp;gt;] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
  [&amp;lt;800…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stop value is derived from bprm-&amp;gt;p &amp;gt;&amp;gt; PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable
is an unsigned long. If bprm-&amp;gt;p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes
zero the loop condition index &amp;gt;= stop is always true.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and
bprm-&amp;gt;page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array.
The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to
kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that
lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn&amp;#39;t
terminate either...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Getting there only requires bprm-&amp;gt;p &amp;lt; PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU
bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only
constraint on how far bprm-&amp;gt;p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e.
that each individual string still fits in what is left.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bprm-&amp;gt;p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a
single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves
it in the first page:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Oops - load access fault [#1]
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1
  epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
   ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae
   s4 : ffffffffffffffff   s2 : 0000000000000000
   a1 : ffffffdc98000000   a2 : 0000000000001000
  status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005
  [&amp;lt;801a5324&amp;gt;] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
  [&amp;lt;800…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68187</guid>
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