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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:31:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-68125 — mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68125</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;assoclen += datalen - authlen;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;assoclen += datalen - authlen;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68125</guid>
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