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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:00:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-68119 — tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68119</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP
responses with TCP-AO options.  The option length carries the actual MAC
length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a
four-byte boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only.  Thus, when the MAC length is not
four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left
uninitialized and may be transmitted.  For the normal TCP-AO hashing
mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before
hashing the header.  Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path.
This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid
authenticated header.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP
responses with TCP-AO options.  The option length carries the actual MAC
length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a
four-byte boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only.  Thus, when the MAC length is not
four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left
uninitialized and may be transmitted.  For the normal TCP-AO hashing
mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before
hashing the header.  Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path.
This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid
authenticated header.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68119</guid>
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