CVE-2026-68117 — tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create()

Affected: Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create()

When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert() returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves sock->sk pointing at the freed object:

if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) { sk_free(sk); pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n"); return -EINVAL; }

This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the sk_lock spinlock.

tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL (dangling) rather than NULL.

Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release() NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided.

The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC s…

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CVE-2026-68117 — tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create()