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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:54:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64596 — libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64596</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 (&amp;#34;anon_inode: rework assertions&amp;#34;),
path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap&amp;#39;d from a
superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this
way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the
warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50
   do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210
   ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240
   __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never
path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets
them by default instead of each caller setting them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one
visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a
dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion
enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps
  sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 (&amp;#34;anon_inode: rework assertions&amp;#34;),
path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap&amp;#39;d from a
superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this
way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the
warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50
   do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210
   ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240
   __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never
path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets
them by default instead of each caller setting them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one
visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a
dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion
enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps
  sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64596</guid>
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