<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:43:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64566 — xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64566</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source
frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via
__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the
destination SKB&amp;#39;s skb_shinfo-&amp;gt;flags.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed
receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately
owned frags.  A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode
SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over
pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB.  This causes
kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,
skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly
propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this
convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after
__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag
unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source
frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via
__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the
destination SKB&amp;#39;s skb_shinfo-&amp;gt;flags.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed
receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately
owned frags.  A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode
SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over
pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB.  This causes
kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,
skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly
propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this
convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after
__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag
unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64566</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
