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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 02:03:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64444 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64444</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE-&amp;gt;length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i &amp;lt; pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE-&amp;gt;length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE-&amp;gt;length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can&amp;#39;t read header).
  2. Break if the IE&amp;#39;s declared data extends past pkt_len.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE-&amp;gt;length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i &amp;lt; pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE-&amp;gt;length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE-&amp;gt;length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can&amp;#39;t read header).
  2. Break if the IE&amp;#39;s declared data extends past pkt_len.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64444</guid>
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