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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:28:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64416 — mm: swap_cgroup: fix NULL deref in lookup_swap_cgroup_id on swapless host</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: swap_cgroup: fix NULL deref in lookup_swap_cgroup_id on swapless host&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;lookup_swap_cgroup_id() passes swap_cgroup_ctrl[type].map to
__swap_cgroup_id_lookup() without checking that the type was ever
registered via swap_cgroup_swapon().  On a swapless host every ctrl-&amp;gt;map
is NULL, so __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() dereferences NULL + a scaled
swp_offset().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit bea67dcc5eea (&amp;#34;mm: attempt to batch free swap entries for
zap_pte_range()&amp;#34;), zap_pte_range() -&amp;gt; swap_pte_batch() calls
lookup_swap_cgroup_id() on any non-present, non-none PTE that decodes as a
real swap entry, without first validating it against swap_info[].  A
single PTE corrupted into a type-0 swap entry takes the host down at
process exit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We hit this in production on a swapless 6.12.58 host: ~1s of
&amp;#34;get_swap_device: Bad swap file entry 3f800204222bb&amp;#34; (do_swap_page() being
correctly defensive about the same entry) followed by&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000003f800204220
  RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x2b/0x60
  Call Trace:
   swap_pte_batch+0xbf/0x230
   zap_pte_range+0x4c8/0x780
   unmap_page_range+0x190/0x3e0
   exit_mmap+0xd9/0x3c0
   do_exit+0x20c/0x4b0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot has reported the identical stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The source of the PTE corruption is a separate bug; this change makes the
teardown path as robust as the fault path already is.  Every other caller
of lookup_swap_cgroup_id() is downstream of a get_swap_device() that ha…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: swap_cgroup: fix NULL deref in lookup_swap_cgroup_id on swapless host&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;lookup_swap_cgroup_id() passes swap_cgroup_ctrl[type].map to
__swap_cgroup_id_lookup() without checking that the type was ever
registered via swap_cgroup_swapon().  On a swapless host every ctrl-&amp;gt;map
is NULL, so __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() dereferences NULL + a scaled
swp_offset().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit bea67dcc5eea (&amp;#34;mm: attempt to batch free swap entries for
zap_pte_range()&amp;#34;), zap_pte_range() -&amp;gt; swap_pte_batch() calls
lookup_swap_cgroup_id() on any non-present, non-none PTE that decodes as a
real swap entry, without first validating it against swap_info[].  A
single PTE corrupted into a type-0 swap entry takes the host down at
process exit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We hit this in production on a swapless 6.12.58 host: ~1s of
&amp;#34;get_swap_device: Bad swap file entry 3f800204222bb&amp;#34; (do_swap_page() being
correctly defensive about the same entry) followed by&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000003f800204220
  RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x2b/0x60
  Call Trace:
   swap_pte_batch+0xbf/0x230
   zap_pte_range+0x4c8/0x780
   unmap_page_range+0x190/0x3e0
   exit_mmap+0xd9/0x3c0
   do_exit+0x20c/0x4b0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot has reported the identical stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The source of the PTE corruption is a separate bug; this change makes the
teardown path as robust as the fault path already is.  Every other caller
of lookup_swap_cgroup_id() is downstream of a get_swap_device() that ha…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64416</guid>
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