<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:36:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64411 — netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64411</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied
32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a
lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., &amp;#34;%s%s&amp;#34;,
&amp;#34;ebtable_&amp;#34;, name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the
stack object until it hits a zero byte.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147
  Call Trace:
  ...
   string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
   vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945)
   __request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150)
   do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380)
   update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440)
   do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573)
   nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101)
   ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424)
   raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847)
   __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via
compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all
find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already
terminate the name after the copy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied
32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a
lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., &amp;#34;%s%s&amp;#34;,
&amp;#34;ebtable_&amp;#34;, name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the
stack object until it hits a zero byte.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147
  Call Trace:
  ...
   string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
   vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945)
   __request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150)
   do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380)
   update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440)
   do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573)
   nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101)
   ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424)
   raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847)
   __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via
compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all
find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already
terminate the name after the copy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64411</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
