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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:43:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64317 — isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of
a Rock Ridge &amp;#34;SL&amp;#34; (symbolic link) record.  Each component is a two-byte
header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies
slp-&amp;gt;len + 2 bytes.  Both loops read slp-&amp;gt;len and advance to the next
component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does
memcpy(rpnt, slp-&amp;gt;text, slp-&amp;gt;len), but neither checks that the component
lies within the SL record before dereferencing it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the
record (rr-&amp;gt;len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255
bytes.  When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for
example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE
record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then
copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user
space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media -
desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without
CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes
before using it.  In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing
output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record m…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of
a Rock Ridge &amp;#34;SL&amp;#34; (symbolic link) record.  Each component is a two-byte
header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies
slp-&amp;gt;len + 2 bytes.  Both loops read slp-&amp;gt;len and advance to the next
component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does
memcpy(rpnt, slp-&amp;gt;text, slp-&amp;gt;len), but neither checks that the component
lies within the SL record before dereferencing it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the
record (rr-&amp;gt;len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255
bytes.  When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for
example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE
record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then
copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user
space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media -
desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without
CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes
before using it.  In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing
output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record m…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64317</guid>
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