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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:26:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64289 — iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64289</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len,
each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel&amp;#39;s struct size
makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess
in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory
trips the soft-lockup watchdog.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop
with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and
flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request
struct, and entry_num under 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 19, the order of a hardware invalidation
queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len,
each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel&amp;#39;s struct size
makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess
in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory
trips the soft-lockup watchdog.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop
with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and
flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request
struct, and entry_num under 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 19, the order of a hardware invalidation
queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64289</guid>
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