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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:48:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64270 — Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64270</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
	if (packet_size &amp;lt;= 0)
		goto out;
	...
	error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
			(u8 *)touch);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size &amp;lt;= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler&amp;#39;s
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
	if (packet_size &amp;lt;= 0)
		goto out;
	...
	error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
			(u8 *)touch);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size &amp;lt;= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler&amp;#39;s
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64270</guid>
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