<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:35:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64186 — iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64186</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables
dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they
are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a
sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already
protected by different mechanisms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string &amp;lt;= 8 bytes, so
   e.g. 0xffffffff isn&amp;#39;t a valid input.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (cnt &amp;gt; OFS_IN_SZ)
     return -EINVAL;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int
   and iommu-&amp;gt;mmio_phys_end is u64&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (dbg_mmio_offset &amp;gt; iommu-&amp;gt;mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))
      return -EINVAL;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and
   refuse to perform the read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the
input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds
memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and
iommu_capability_write().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables
dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they
are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a
sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already
protected by different mechanisms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string &amp;lt;= 8 bytes, so
   e.g. 0xffffffff isn&amp;#39;t a valid input.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (cnt &amp;gt; OFS_IN_SZ)
     return -EINVAL;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int
   and iommu-&amp;gt;mmio_phys_end is u64&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (dbg_mmio_offset &amp;gt; iommu-&amp;gt;mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))
      return -EINVAL;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and
   refuse to perform the read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the
input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds
memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and
iommu_capability_write().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64186</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
