<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:40:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64167 — kho: skip KHO for crash kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64167</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kho: skip KHO for crash kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kho_fill_kimage() unconditionally populates the kimage with KHO
metadata for every kexec image type. When the image is a crash kernel,
this can be problematic as the crash kernel can run in a small reserved
region and the KHO scratch areas can sit outside it.
The crash kernel then faults during kho_memory_init() when it
tries phys_to_virt() on the KHO FDT address:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address xxxxxxxx
  ...
    fdt_offset_ptr+...
    fdt_check_node_offset_+...
    fdt_first_property_offset+...
    fdt_get_property_namelen_+...
    fdt_getprop+...
    kho_memory_init+...
    mm_core_init+...
    start_kernel+...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kho_locate_mem_hole() already skips KHO logic for KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH
images, but kho_fill_kimage() was missing the same guard. As
kho_fill_kimage() is the single point that populates image-&amp;gt;kho.fdt
and image-&amp;gt;kho.scratch, fixing it here is sufficient for both arm64
and x86 as the FDT and boot_params path are bailing out when these
fields are unset.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kho: skip KHO for crash kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kho_fill_kimage() unconditionally populates the kimage with KHO
metadata for every kexec image type. When the image is a crash kernel,
this can be problematic as the crash kernel can run in a small reserved
region and the KHO scratch areas can sit outside it.
The crash kernel then faults during kho_memory_init() when it
tries phys_to_virt() on the KHO FDT address:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address xxxxxxxx
  ...
    fdt_offset_ptr+...
    fdt_check_node_offset_+...
    fdt_first_property_offset+...
    fdt_get_property_namelen_+...
    fdt_getprop+...
    kho_memory_init+...
    mm_core_init+...
    start_kernel+...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kho_locate_mem_hole() already skips KHO logic for KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH
images, but kho_fill_kimage() was missing the same guard. As
kho_fill_kimage() is the single point that populates image-&amp;gt;kho.fdt
and image-&amp;gt;kho.scratch, fixing it here is sufficient for both arm64
and x86 as the FDT and boot_params path are bailing out when these
fields are unset.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64167</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
