<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:35:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64025 — bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64025</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and
defers to psock-&amp;gt;saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present,
avoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser&amp;#39;s ownership of the receive
queue (commit e91de6afa81c, &amp;#34;bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types
with ktls&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard.  When a socket
is inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is
configured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready
as rx_ctx-&amp;gt;saved_data_ready.  On data arrival:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tls_data_ready -&amp;gt; tls_strp_data_ready -&amp;gt; tls_rx_msg_ready
    -&amp;gt; saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()
      -&amp;gt; tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink()
         without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() &amp;gt;= full_len (stale), calls
tcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and
returns with rx_ctx-&amp;gt;strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned
(potentially freed) skb.  tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that
frag_list: use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context
is present, call psock-&amp;gt;saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake
recv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue
untouched.  TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the
re…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and
defers to psock-&amp;gt;saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present,
avoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser&amp;#39;s ownership of the receive
queue (commit e91de6afa81c, &amp;#34;bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types
with ktls&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard.  When a socket
is inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is
configured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready
as rx_ctx-&amp;gt;saved_data_ready.  On data arrival:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tls_data_ready -&amp;gt; tls_strp_data_ready -&amp;gt; tls_rx_msg_ready
    -&amp;gt; saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()
      -&amp;gt; tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink()
         without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() &amp;gt;= full_len (stale), calls
tcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and
returns with rx_ctx-&amp;gt;strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned
(potentially freed) skb.  tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that
frag_list: use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context
is present, call psock-&amp;gt;saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake
recv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue
untouched.  TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the
re…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64025</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
