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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 04:38:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-63891 — thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63891</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A DIRECTORY entry&amp;#39;s value field is used as the dir_offset for a
recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter.
A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference
loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the
guard page fires.  Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line
inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST
control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and
__tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed
TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8.  That is comfortably larger than any
observed legitimate XDomain layout.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable
the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command
line.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A DIRECTORY entry&amp;#39;s value field is used as the dir_offset for a
recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter.
A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference
loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the
guard page fires.  Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line
inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST
control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and
__tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed
TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8.  That is comfortably larger than any
observed legitimate XDomain layout.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable
the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command
line.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63891</guid>
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