https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 22:37:21 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63831 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto</p> <p>llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb&#39;s linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).</p> <p>On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.</p> <p>On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb&#39;s head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).</p> <p>The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb&#39;s data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by:</p> <p>- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto</p> <p>llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb&#39;s linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).</p> <p>On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.</p> <p>On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb&#39;s head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).</p> <p>The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb&#39;s data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by:</p> <p>- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63831