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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:41:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53246 — sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53246</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached
peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters
are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not
validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If
the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the
actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential
memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE
processing and kmemdup() copies).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT
chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO
buffer before it is used.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached
peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters
are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not
validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If
the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the
actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential
memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE
processing and kmemdup() copies).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT
chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO
buffer before it is used.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53246</guid>
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