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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:11:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53240 — xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53240</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb under
drop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out
of the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb
without the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (first_skb &amp;amp;&amp;amp; first_iplen &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !defer &amp;amp;&amp;amp; first_skb != xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running
iptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete
reassembly, NULL xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb, and free the skb. The check then
evaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb
operate on the freed skb — a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Replace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether
first_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The
flag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the
pointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff
first_skb was stored in ra_newskb).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb under
drop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out
of the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb
without the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (first_skb &amp;amp;&amp;amp; first_iplen &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !defer &amp;amp;&amp;amp; first_skb != xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running
iptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete
reassembly, NULL xtfs-&amp;gt;ra_newskb, and free the skb. The check then
evaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb
operate on the freed skb — a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Replace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether
first_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The
flag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the
pointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff
first_skb was stored in ra_newskb).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53240</guid>
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