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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:34:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-53137 — drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53137</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why &amp;amp; How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink&amp;#39;s RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why &amp;amp; How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink&amp;#39;s RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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