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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:36:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53134 — netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53134</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via &amp;#34;*dest = 0&amp;#34;. The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()&amp;#39;s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- replace the bare &amp;#34;*dest = 0&amp;#34; in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
   which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
   used on the other early-return path), and&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
   destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
   the eval writes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via &amp;#34;*dest = 0&amp;#34;. The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()&amp;#39;s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- replace the bare &amp;#34;*dest = 0&amp;#34; in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
   which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
   used on the other early-return path), and&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
   destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
   the eval writes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53134</guid>
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