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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:57:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53130 — fs/omfs: reject s_sys_blocksize smaller than OMFS_DIR_START</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53130</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/omfs: reject s_sys_blocksize smaller than OMFS_DIR_START&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;omfs_fill_super() rejects oversized s_sys_blocksize values (&amp;gt; PAGE_SIZE),
but it does not reject values smaller than OMFS_DIR_START (0x1b8 = 440).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Later, omfs_make_empty() uses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sbi-&amp;gt;s_sys_blocksize - OMFS_DIR_START&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;as the length argument to memset().  Since s_sys_blocksize is u32,
a crafted filesystem image with s_sys_blocksize &amp;lt; OMFS_DIR_START causes
an unsigned underflow there, wrapping to a value near 2^32.  That drives
a ~4 GiB memset() from bh-&amp;gt;b_data + OMFS_DIR_START and overwrites kernel
memory far beyond the backing block buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add the corresponding lower-bound check alongside the existing upper-bound
check in omfs_fill_super(), so that malformed images are rejected during
superblock validation before any filesystem data is processed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/omfs: reject s_sys_blocksize smaller than OMFS_DIR_START&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;omfs_fill_super() rejects oversized s_sys_blocksize values (&amp;gt; PAGE_SIZE),
but it does not reject values smaller than OMFS_DIR_START (0x1b8 = 440).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Later, omfs_make_empty() uses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sbi-&amp;gt;s_sys_blocksize - OMFS_DIR_START&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;as the length argument to memset().  Since s_sys_blocksize is u32,
a crafted filesystem image with s_sys_blocksize &amp;lt; OMFS_DIR_START causes
an unsigned underflow there, wrapping to a value near 2^32.  That drives
a ~4 GiB memset() from bh-&amp;gt;b_data + OMFS_DIR_START and overwrites kernel
memory far beyond the backing block buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add the corresponding lower-bound check alongside the existing upper-bound
check in omfs_fill_super(), so that malformed images are rejected during
superblock validation before any filesystem data is processed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53130</guid>
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