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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:54:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46314 — drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46314</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;v3d_get_extensions() walks a userspace-provided singly-linked list of
ioctl extensions without any bound on the chain length. A local user
can craft a self-referential extension (ext-&amp;gt;next == &amp;amp;ext) with zero
in_sync_count and out_sync_count, which bypasses the existing duplicate-
extension guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (se-&amp;gt;in_sync_count || se-&amp;gt;out_sync_count)
            return -EINVAL;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard never fires because v3d_get_multisync_post_deps() returns
immediately when count is zero, leaving both fields at zero on every
iteration. The result is an infinite loop in kernel context, blocking
the calling thread and pegging a CPU core indefinitely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by rejecting a multisync extension where both in_sync_count
and out_sync_count are zero in v3d_get_multisync_submit_deps(). An
empty multisync carries no synchronization information and serves no
useful purpose, so returning -EINVAL for such an extension is the
correct defense against this attack vector.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;v3d_get_extensions() walks a userspace-provided singly-linked list of
ioctl extensions without any bound on the chain length. A local user
can craft a self-referential extension (ext-&amp;gt;next == &amp;amp;ext) with zero
in_sync_count and out_sync_count, which bypasses the existing duplicate-
extension guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (se-&amp;gt;in_sync_count || se-&amp;gt;out_sync_count)
            return -EINVAL;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard never fires because v3d_get_multisync_post_deps() returns
immediately when count is zero, leaving both fields at zero on every
iteration. The result is an infinite loop in kernel context, blocking
the calling thread and pegging a CPU core indefinitely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by rejecting a multisync extension where both in_sync_count
and out_sync_count are zero in v3d_get_multisync_submit_deps(). An
empty multisync carries no synchronization information and serves no
useful purpose, so returning -EINVAL for such an extension is the
correct defense against this attack vector.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46314</guid>
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